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Introduction

U.S. interest in and attention to Iran's nuclear development can be traced back to the
Atoms for Peace Program in the 1950's, but for nearly a decade now, the Iranian nuclear
program of has been at the center of international attention. Iranian efforts in nuclear energy
research and development seem to support their desire to achieve the capability to produce
highly enriched uranium, the principal ingredient in a nuclear weapon, but absolute evidence that
proves the development of the other aspects of a militarized nuclear program is lacking.
The pursuit of uranium enrichment in and of itself would not be a violation of the current
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the international treaty put in place to combat the
spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five established nuclear weapon states with the eventual
goal of getting to a "global zero" with the abolition of all nuclear weapons. Given Iran's
adherence to the universal full-scope safeguards and additional protocol of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its enrichment pursuits would be above reproach.
Unfortunately, it has been continuously found to be in violation of the IAEA compliance
provisions and is suspected to be close to attaining a nuclear weapons capability.
As a non-nuclear weapons state signer of the NPT, Iran affirmatively has the legal right
to the ensured access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology, but it has barrned any outside
inspectors thus it remains unclear whether or not they have more sinister plans. Iran's leadership
insists that its goal in developing the nuclear program and enrichment capability is to generate
electricity without dipping into its oil supply, which they prefer to use as a considerable source
1
of income, and to energize their medical reactors. However, Iran's noncompliance with the
universal full-scope safeguards and additional protocol, their illusory behavior regarding the
1
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progress of its uranium enrichment technology, and the unconvincing economic arguments made
2
to justify the pursuit has provoked broad international opposition to the program.
Dealing with Iran's nuclear and missile programs are among the most complex and most
consequential of all international issues facing policy makers today. While the theocratic
government in Tehran has repeatedly claimed that it seeks only to develop civilian nuclear power
to augment their natural resource advantage, most of the world remains skeptical. There is

no

evidence that Iran has indeed crossed the nuclear threshold, however as Dr. Caravelli states,
Because the technology used to enrich uranium t o three percent to five percent in
the isotope 235, the enrichment level used for nuclear power reactors, is the same
technology that is required to enrich uranium to higher levels suitable for a
nuclear device, nations such as Iran could, if they choose, develop enrichment
technology to a certain level under a 'peaceful nuclear energy program' while
reserving the option of 'breaking out' at a future date with a program of higher
3
level enrichment.
Moreover, the talk of"trigger points" with respect to a U.S. or Israeli response may help
to incentivize Iran to develop their capability right up to the crossing of those deadlines or
"trigger points" until their infrastructure fortifications are complete. This"breakout option"
postulates that Iran's nuclear program facilitators would have all of the components of a nuclear
weapon fully developed, in place, and once given the order, could assemble and threaten to
launch a weapon in the most expedient manner. Dr. Caravelli goes on to postulate how difficult it
would be to predict when Iran crosses that nuclear threshold and the "breakout option"
contributes to the difficulty ofsllch an endeavor. Such a step is not even inevitable, however, and
whether or not Iran meets the speculated ambitions of becoming the next militarized nuclear
power will depend greatly on not only their internal politics, but the non-nuclear state will also

2
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have to overcome a combination of technical hurdles, economic disincentives, and military and
diplomatic pressure.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the IAEA, through diplomacy, have
attempted to address this critical issue to no avail even after the UN General Council passed a
Resolution in 2006 demanding that Iran suspend its enrichment and submit to important arms
control measures. 4 Iran's steadfastness in the face of these organizations may be attributed to the
absence of their ability to commit a credible military threat to Iran, one may think, but even
nations with that ability have gained little in their attempts as well. Since 2003, France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom- all with the support of the United States- have been party
to negotiations aimed at suspending any further Iranian nuclear enrichment, but nevertheless
their diplomacy has been unsuccessful thus far and there is no indication oflranian deviation in
the foreseeable future. 5
Nevertheless, considering the both the overlap in the development of a peaceful nuclear
program and a militarized one and the ambiguities in the NPT which allow a non-nuclear
weapons state signer, such as Iran, to be granted a certain amount of leeway with respect to its
nuclear development, if the authorities responsible for enforcing and inspecting the compliance
of the NPT do not have the ability to invoke military consequences for noncompliance, such as
the UNSC and IAEA, then the NPT cannot be expected to carry much weight when the desire for
a militarized nuclear program exceeds a certain threshold. The NPT in this regard, it seems, is

·

inherently weak and lacked teeth from the start and its renegotiations could possibly serve as a
"jumping off' point in which to combat the opportunity for the current issues with Iran to

4 Crane, Keith. "Iran and International Sanctions: Elements of Weakness and Resilience." Iran's Nuclear
Programme: Strategic Implications. Ed. Krause, Joachim. New York: Routledge, 2012. Pgs. 111-122.
Print.
5 Posen, B arry R. "A Nuclear-Armed Iran: A Difficult but Not Impossible Policy Problem." A Century Foundation
Report 2006. We!J..
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escalate. Major concessions will be have to be made on both sides, existing nuclear weapon
programs may have to vastly reduce their inventories, but time is running out for an amicable
diplomatic solution to this international issue and averting a nuclear Iran or avoiding a large
scale international conflict may be worth the reduction.
As negotiations have failed, interested powers such as the United States, the European
Union, and Iran's neighbors face policy questions about what to do going forward. They must
determine if the political coercion and economic sanctions thus far have been effective and if
they should or could be ratcheted up even further; ifa preventive attack is worthwhile for the
policy objectives that are currently in place, and if that preventive attack is in fact deemed
worthwhile is it even feasible for the wanting state to carry out; or is it reasonable and
appropriate for these powers to develop strategies of containment and deterrence to coexist with
a nuclear-armed Iran given their successful development of a milit arized nuclear program
accompanied by an effective delivery system.

6

Background
As previously mentioned, Iran has a protracted history in the development of its nuclear
program while U.S. interest in that program can be traced back to the 1950's. Under the support
of the Atoms for Peace Program th e United States signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with
Iran and, until the fall of Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1979, the United States provided various types of
training and technical assistance to Iran.7 Russia, South Africa, Pakistan, and China have also
held important roles in the progress oflran's nuclear program to date and, with the exception of
South Africa, hold important points of leverage, both diplomatically and economically, on the
outcome of the program in its current state. Much of these cooperative endeavors were not with a
6

7

Ibid. Pg. 7
Caravelli, Jack. Nuclear Insecurity: Understanding the Threatsfrom Rogue Nations and Terrorists. Westport, CT:
Praeger Securi1y International,. 2008. Print.

6
direct intent of proliferation, but one of the inherent problems of nuclear technology in general is
its duel use. A well-intended technology transfer to a civilian nuclear program or the right of
access to a non-nuclear state signor of the NPT can indirectly support weapons-related research.
A consequence that the Shah assuredly understood arid may \Vel! have harbored his own plan,
based on his seemingly benign cooperative relationships with the United States as well as other
nations, to develop at least a nuclear weapons option. 8
After the Shah was overthrown in 1979, U.S. suspicions about Iran's nuclear ambitions
increased when anti-U.S. sentiment began to popularize in Iran under Grand Ayatollah Sayyed
Ruhollah Musavi K.homeini's regime. This sentiment is exemplified by the hostage crisis in
which Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran conceivably in response to President
Jimmy Carter allowing the deposed former ruler oflran, Shah Reza Pahlavi, to enter the U.S. for
medical treatment. It has been hypothesized that the popular belief in Iran at the time was that
this was the first step in an egregious attempt by the U.S. to return power to the overthrown
Shah. An unsubstantiated claim, however, that has not since been confirmed.
The severed diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran has hardly recovered
and has since largely been classified as a protracted conflict.9 It was not until President Bill
Clinton's time in office that a concerted U.S. diplomatic strategy was designed with the purpose
10
of ending or slowing Iran's path toward a nuclear weapon. And according to the Institute of
Peace, "any prospect of improvement was complicated by sanctions dating back to the 1979 U.S.
Embassy takeover and an American public intensely ·distrUstful of the Islamic Republic's
policies. Iran was also reportedly the major patron of Lebanon's Hezbollah, which actively
opposed the Middle East peace process and engaged in regular clashes with Israeli forces in
8
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ll
Lebanon, a strong ally to the U.S:" Since then, the administrations of President George W.
Bush and President Barak Obama have subsequently expended considerable effort on the Iranian
problem but a lack of compromise has led to the military pressures and economic sanctions that
are in place today.
To date, the United States, United Nations, and the European Union hold sanctions
against Iran with a history of U.S. sanctions going back to the hostage crisis of 1979. Billions of
dollars worth of Iranian assets have been frozen over the years li!ld virtually all trade and
investment activities with Iran by any U.S. citizen have only been continuously banned since
1997. In 2010, the United States passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act, which enacted the most stringent trade restrictions for U.S. firms to date with
violators facing a fine of up to

$1 million and 20 years imprisonment.12 U.S. citizens may not

even export goods or services to a third country knowing that they are intended for Iran.
Sanctions aimed at Iran's financial sector restrict "servicing accounts of the govermnent of
13
Iran," including the country's central bank, and prohibit groups that do business with financial
institutions in Iran from holding accounts in the United States. In 2011 the United States evoked
further measures, including tightening restrictions on companies that provide Iran with
equipment and expertise to

run

its oil and chemical industry and sanctions targeting powerful

governmental groups such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij Resistance Force,
14
and several individuals.
As a result of the lack of transparency and noncompliance with UN and IAEA inspectors
regarding the additional protocol provisions within the NPT, the Security Council has
11
12
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convincingly passed multiple resolutions since 2006 incurring even further sanctions on Iran
from the international community. Aside from the overt prohibition of the import of nuclear
weapons making material, helicopter gun ships and missiles were also cited as contraband and
the Council prohibited their export to Iran in a 2010 resolution. Despite Iran's claims that their
nuclear pursuits are purely civilian in nature and legal under the NPT, the most recent UNSC
resolution has called upon all UN states to block Iran's import and export of "sensitive nuclear
material and equipment," to freeze the financial assets, and restrict the international travel of
those deemed to b e involved in Iran's nuclear activities.15
Sanctions imposed by the European Union recently are reported to have had the greatest
impact on the average Iranian citizen, a demographic that could eventually bring change to Iran
through a shift in priorities and national sentiment once the general population feels the impact
of it's governments choices on their own finances. Banning the import oflranian crude oil and
petroleum products, freezing all of the financial assets of Iran's central bank in European Union
markets, and blocking trade in gold, diamonds, and precious metals with Iran most certainly will
have an effect on Iran's economy .16 The path for outside economic sanctions alone to take root
and initiate the kind of change that is intended is a long and strenuous one and may result in
extended recessionary periods as the world economy is delicately recovering from its own
economic downturn. Hopefully the measures put in place in 2010 that restrict the import of
"equipment that might be used for internal repression" coupled with the sanctions directly aimed
at the Basij, the Revolutionary Guard, and other internal civil unrest enforcement entities will
have the greatest impact as Iran gets set to have a presidential election in 2013.

"Security Council Coriunittee established pursuant to resolution 1737 ( 2006)," United Nations. N.P. Web. April
2012.
16
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2012. Web. April2012.
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The Implications of a Nuclear Iran

In Jack Caravelli's analysis of the Iranian nuclear weapons program in his book, Nuclear
Insecurity, he lists the potential threats and implications of a militarized nuclear Iran. His time as

a CIA analyst and as a diplomat and the U.S. Department of State's Director ofNonproliferation,
Dr. Caravelli has developed an extensive and well thought out series of questions to consider
when contemplating the implications of a nuclear Iran. To which only an additional two points
should be added. His questions of note are the following:

(1) In an already badly troubled region, what changes would likely occur in U.S.
relations with various Middle East nations that would be within range oflranian
missiles that would be nuclear armed? Would those nations seek closer political
or security ties to Washington or, alternatively, seek more independent policies?
(2) How would Tehran assess its newfound capabilities? Would it pursue more
regional policies that eschew brandishing its weapons or pursue more overtly
aggressive policies by using its nuclear might as a political weapon or to support
other policy options such as even more expanded support to terrorist
organizations in the region such as Hezbollah? Little is known about Iran's
thinking on the linkage between nuclear capabilities and political objectives.
(3) Even if Iran did not seek to provide nuclear materials or weapons to other
states or terrorist groups, would it develop an appropriate level of security
measures to protect those assets from theft or diversion?
(4) Would Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia come under severe
domestic pressure to undertake efforts to match Iranian nuclear capabilities,
further undermining the already shakyNPT?
(5) What are the implications for the region iflran, a Shi'a dominated society,
becomes a nuclear power in a Muslim world where Sunni domination, both in
terms of population and political influence, long has been predominant?
(6) How wonld Israel respond to or confront a threat described by Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1997, and other Israeli prime ministers as
"existential?" That threat could arise not only from direct military action but also

lO

from Tehran's possible willingness to provide nuclear materials or weapons to
terrorist groups.17
Although Dr. Caravelli's considerations are astute, due to the rapidly changing
environment of international events two additions should be made to his list. For example, given
the developing situation with Syria- the scale of which was potentially unknown to Dr.
Caravelli when he authored his book- and their historical relationship with Iran, the implications
of Syria gaining a nuclear ally is worth thinking about. So, with Iran being Syria's biggest
regional ally, how would a nuclear Iran affect the current pressures for a regime change in Syria
and would it embolden Bashar al-Assad to further devastate his domestic opposition?
Additionally, due to the longstanding accusations of Iran contributing funds, weapons,

and

manpower to known terrorist groups, would Iran become even more emboldened with respect to
its alleged contributions to know terrorist networks? Could Iran become a more prominent safe

haven for those terrorist groups or terror supporters?
Considering the international complexity of a would-be response to Iran in their alleged
quest for a nuclear weapon, policy makers in the United States, European Union, and United
Nations must consider all of the options ·and implications before a policy, especially a military
one, is advanced. With the increased globalization and integration of markets, the effects from
the respective policy will undoubtedly be felt worldwide, particularly with an Iranian border
heavily influencing the waterway in which roughly twenty percent of the world's oil passes
through. Policies that ate designed to frustrate the very reasons for Iran to be after nuclear
weapons would obviously be the ideal policies to install, however, identifying those reasons is
not a trivial exercise and, at this point, Iran's national security interests can only be speculated.
Speculated using the last thirty or so years in reference, but speculated nonetheless. Iran's
1
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leadership clearly has a vested interest in keeping their highest prioritized national security
interest secret.

Iran's National Security Interests
While currently Iran appears to be mildly ·stable politically, this could be deceiving as
true political sentiment is hard to observe with a hegemonic government. The perceived stability
could be fleeting as the election nears, but the degree to which instability significantly changes
Iranian policy is unclear. With evidence that Iran's overall national security interests are broadly
supported by a large section of the population, including the nuclear program, transition from the
current regime may not adjust current pursuits.18
Regardless of the political evolution in the coming years, the current regime is heavily
motivated by its perception oflran's national security interests. These interests involve ensuring
the survival of the current regime, protecting Iran and Iranian interests against external threats in particular deterring a U.S. invasion oflran -conceivably by neutralizing U.S. conventional
military superiority, and maintaining Iran's influence and power in the Middle East.19 Since the
Iraq War, in fact, Iran is reported to see its position in the region as strengthened.20Arguably
Iran's nuclear aspirations parallel a desire to expand their power on the international stage, but
the maintenance of their regional influence is considered primary. An expansionary policy could
materialize if a viable nuclear weapons program could be leveraged to that end.
T o ensure the survival of the regime under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khomenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is another focus of Iran's national security
18
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strategy. As a result of the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq to remove the Taliban and
Saddam Hussein from power, Iran's inner leadership circle has since felt that its Islamic regime
is in grave danger. They feared that the United States would eventually use Iraq and Mghanistan
as footholds through which to invade Iran and overthrow the current regime and the Islamic
Republic as a whole.21 The vast amount of troop deployments and continuous U.S. military
presence on Iran's eastern flank, western flank, and in the Persian Gulf since 2001, through the
declared end of conflict in Iraq and up to present day has attributed to Iran's threatened feeling.
One could even suggest that the U.S. saturation of the region is a contributing factor to the
Iranian feeling of need to protect itself by way of nuclear armament
Iran's leaders are also concerned about the United States using Iran's domestic opposition
to destabilize the regime.22 With the recent internal dissident groups overthrowing rulers in
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen in a movement dubbed the "Arab Spring," the Supreme
Leader Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahrnadinejad, purportedly view the uprising as U.S.
sponsored and akin to the mass protests of the "velvet revolution" in the June 2009 Iranian
presidential election.23 A recent RAND Corporation report asserts that, "Iran's leadership,
especially conservatives and fundamentalists who have come to increasingly dominate politics,
thus believe that the threat from the United States is multidimensional, with the United States
exerting political; military, economic, cultural, and ideological levers of power to challenge
Iran."24 Saudi Arabia-the self-proclaimed leader of the Sunni Muslim World-is also perceived

21 Thaler, David E., Alireza Nader, Shahram Chubin, Jerrold D. Green, Charlotte Lynch, and Frederic Wehrey.
Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: A n Exploration ofIranian Leadership Dynamics. Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2010. Web.

22 "Leader Calls US, Zionists Iran's Worst Enemies," Fars News Agency. N. P. January 26, 2010. Web. April2012.
23 Zamaneh, Radio. "Iran Intelligence Minister 'Identities' 80 Dissident Groups," December 23, 2009. Web.
24 Davis, Lynn E., Jeffrey Martini, Alireza Nader, Dalia Dassa Kaye, James T. Quinlivau, and Paul Steinberg.
"Iran's Nuclear Future: Critical U.S. Policy Choices." Project Air Force. Sauta Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 201 1 . Web.
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to be another source of potential unrest by Iran's Shi'a hardliners as the Sunnis and Shi'as have

been involved in perpetual conflict since the

1979 revolution.

A conventionally strong Israel, the nuclear armed Pakistan, the envelopment by U.S.
forces, and the bitter Sunni rival of Saudi Arabia ar e viewed as the primary security threats in
Iran's objective of defending the homeland. As Iran has used unconventional forces and terrorist
groups to further its national interests in the past, threats to those entities are also taken as threats
to the homeland as they could affect regional dominance. Iran has substantial incentives to

maintain their relationship and solidarity with Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas precisely for
conserving regional influence. The hypothesis that Iran does not view the elimination of Israel as
a fundamental foreign policy goal despite the regime's harsh rhetoric but views Israel only as an
ideological and geopolitical threat may be controversial in the U.S., considering its own political
rhetoric, however, there seems to be historical evidence that strengthens the hypothesis. Even
further strengthened is the suggestion that Iran is far more threatened by the proximity and
breadth of U.S. forces in the region.25
Additionally, a dominating Iranian national security interest is to maintain its regional
influence and to sustain its professed right to act as the preeminent power in the Persian Gulf
region. Iran will seek to increase its military support for its allies in the region, Hezbollah,
Harnas, and Syria as it views itself the innate regional power player. In the near future, Iran will
26
continue to set objectives aimed at maintaining that role.
The relationships between Iran and its geopolitical rivals are unlikely to change in the
near future, and iflran is successful in attaining a nuclear weapon, the Sunni Arab states such as
Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia may further add to the regional volatility by seeking to join

2
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Pakistan and Iran in the nuclear club. This outcome would be an all out threat to nonproliferation
and the aspirations of a "global zero," and could easily spiral into a worldwide arms race that
President Kennedy cautioned about in 1960. The ''indications that

10, 15, or 20 nations will have

a nuclear capacity"27 becomes a very real scenario that would dwarf the curre nt issues of the day.
Iran's national security interests are unlikely to change in the years ahead regardless of
the short or medium horizon changes that could possibly take place. Iran's pursuit of nuclear
weapons could be viewed as serving those interests by deterring a U.S. invasion oflran,
neutralizing U.S. conventiOnal military superiority, arid expanding Iran's influence and power in
the region. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of U.S. and international decision makers to
influence the Iranian kadership in how it carries out these interests and how it weights the costs
and benefits ·of developing nuclear weapons.28
The response oflran to outside influences is also dependent on the assumption that Iran is
a rational actor. There are strong positions on either side of the argument, however, the lion share
of academia and military leaders and analysis believe that Iran "assesses costs and benefits in
making foreign policy decisions and, therefore, can be expected to act rationally in the future."29
The intricate arguments on either side are beyond the scope of this paper, but the prevailing point
of view is that with respect to Iran's foreign policy over the last 30 years their motives "can be
understood through the lens of Iran's interests in regime survival, maintaining territorial
sovereignty, and expanding its regional influence."30 Thus, by tipping the scale in the direction

27 Kennedy, John F. "The Third Kennedy-Nixon Presidential Debate." New York City. October 1 3 , 1 960.

Presidential Debate.
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Corporation, 201 1. Web.
29 lbid. Pg. 1 2
30 lbid. Pg. 1 2
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of heavier costs or greater gains, Iran's foreign and domestic policy objectives can theoretically
be influenced by outside actors.

Influencing Iran: Diplomacy
Even though Iran has largely made itself unavailable for direct diplomatic·discussion and
the past attempts at diplomacy have yet to induce the desired effect on its nuclear program, Iran
is responding to the international diplomatic pressure in several ways. While Western states
make an effort to pressure Iran from multiple angles, one of their first measures was to limit the
influence that Iran has ·on world oil markets. In preparation for the follow ·on sanctions that could
shrink or eliminate the European demand for oil from Iran, the U.S. and representative states
from the European Union asked the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
and specifically Saudi Arabia, to offset the gap in the oil trade by increasing its oil production. In
response, Iran is again trying to leverage its perceived place of regional dominance to reverse
OPEC's compliance with the Western requests and it is looking to minimize the expected
economic damage by seeking new markets for its oil.· Currently, the effects of OPEC's
production offsets are unrealized as the policies remain young, but China and India are less
ardent about the no oil trade policies Of the West and have only somewhat limited their Iranian
oil purchases. There is evidence that India and China have lessened those purchases, but it is not
31
clear as to how much they have lessened or how long they will continue to do so. Regardless,
even without direct talks, an Iranian response can be observed. Coupled with limiting Iran's
resources to be funneled toward its nuclear program, these results were the results sought with
the West's indirect diplomatic policies.
Most European countries are not dependent on Iranian oil; however, there are a handful
of countries that do import a significant amount of their oil from Iran. In the attempt to drive a
31
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wedge between the countries that do rely on Iran for their oil needs and those that do not, Iran is
threatening to no longer export oil to any European countries. In Iranian eyes, this signals that
the proposed sanctions are in no way having an effect on Iran economically, that Iran will not
bend to the will of any other state, and it preempts the Western sanctions so it appears to be
Iran's decision to discontinue trade and not the other way around. Yet the Iranian policy
contributes to the idea that a reactionary Iran is an Iran that is being affected by diplomatic
policies, as the sustainability for an Iran that is not gaining heavily from the export of its oil is
questionable.
It is evident that Iran's desire to do as it sees fit is not diplomatically unopposed.

Displayed by their proposal to return to the negotiation table, Iranian plans are being influenced
by Western diplomacy and they will soon feel the full effect of the harshest oil sanctions set to
take place in July

2012. The proposal to return to the negotiations table could be a delay tactic

used to gain valuable time to produce a nuclear capability and to fortify their nuclear
infrastructure to mitigate the threat of a preemptive attack, but it represents a move in the right
direction, and shows that diplomacy is having an effect. However, most intelligence sources
agree that Iran is still close to a year away from enriching enough fissile material for a nuclear
weapon and although the fortification of their nuclear infrastructure may protect their program
from complete destruction, a preemptive attack may not come in the conventional form that Iran
is expecting.
Even if th e delivery ofa preemptive attack did come in the expected conventional form,
covering a nuclear facility in rubble can still delay or render the effected site temporarily
inoperable. Moreover, Israel is suggesting that the time for negotiations is running out for Iran,
and even though U.S. policy makers have not endorsed an attack by Israel, the threat can

17

possibly serve

as

a powerful incentive to get Iran back to the negotiation table where, hopefully,

substantive discussions will take place. As long

as

Iran presents a serious attitude toward new

discussions, it would behoove the U.S. and the world to reopen the avenues of communication.
The renegotiation of the inherently weak NPT and the empowennent of the UNSC and IAEA
could potentially be positive place to start. That way the U.S. and its allies could take a backseat
to newly strengthened international enforcement.ofthe two organizations, and Iran would feel
that the issues at hand were less about religious and cultural ideologies, and more about the
worldwide hopes for the complete reduction of all nuclear arsenals to a "global zero."

Influencing Iran: Sanctions
Many academic endeavors have devoted time and effort to research on the "rallying
around the flag phenomenon" that occurs when a country can be unified in hardship through war
or imposition of the will of another on a nation. "Sanctions that squeeze are more effective than
threats that galvanize and unify,''32 and there should be specific targets to an effective scheme of
sanctions. Iran has a unique profile of vulnerabilities to exploit for the biggest impact on policy
due to the imposed sanctions. Based on experience with imposing sanctions on other infant
nuclear programs with a desire to militarize, effective steps should be taken to influence Iran's
trade of dual-use technology, defined by technologies that contribute to the development of a
particular weapons system and technology that is not related to the development of any particular
weapons system, but rather to the development of military capabilities more generally,33 oil

32 Russel� Richard

L. "Military Options for Preventing a Nuclear-Armed Iran." Iran's Nuclear Programme:
Strategic Implications. Ed. Krause, Joachim. New York: Routledge, 2012. Pgs. 111-122. Print.
33 Evans, Samuel A. "Defining DUal-Use: An International Assessmentofthe Discourses Around Technology,
Presentation given to the ESRC New Directions in WMD Proliferation Seminar Series, 27 February 2006.
.
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related exports, equipment related to the oil and gas industry, the financial sector, and the
international travel of those people who are involved in the nuclear program in any way.34
Pakistan and Libya serve as examples of the effectiveness of embargoes on dual-use
technologies in slowing or deterring nuclear programs. Although Pakistan eventually achieved its
objective, it reported being severely delayed from the sanctions that contributed to the complete
inability for Libya t o go nuclear. While these·embargoes can limit the imports of high-quality
materials and equipment designed specifically for the enrichment of fissile material, due to the
wide range of suppliers, the more generic equipmentthat could be used toward the development
of nuclear weapons is harder to regulate. The international community would serve itself well if
it could limit and track any and all such equipment that enters Iran, however, as it is with all
embargoes -the policy is only as good as its enforcement.
Iran is currently a net importer of gasoline and has vast incentive t o remain a net
exporter of oil. The oil and gas sector represents a siguificant vulnerability to the Irauian
econOilly, worthy of substantial attention with regard for effective embargoes. Structurally, Iran's
oil and gasoline sector is in dire need of reform. Oil exports account for 65 percent of
government revenues and oil, gas, and refined petroleum products account for 74 percent of
exports. 35 Iran's overreliance on the sector and lack of trade diversification alone do not
necessarily represent needs for restructuring, but coupled with global instability in the market,
economic disincentives to popularize fuel efficient transportation from perpetual subsidies for
domestic gas sales, and excess demand created by a population that has doubled since the

34 Crane, Keith. "Iran and International Sanctions: Elements of Weakness and Resilience." Iran's Nuclear
Programme: Strategic Implications. Ed. Krause, Joachim. New York: Routledge, 2012. Pgs. 1 1 1-122.
Print.
35 Jotemational Monetary Fund (IMP), 2010a: "Islamic Republic oflran, 2009 Article IV Consultation," IMF
Country Report 1 0/74, March.
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revolution in 1979 have all incurred a need for restructuring that Iran's parliament is just starting
to address.
The other side of this problem, which can be further targeted by sanction policy, is the
hindered supply· caused by underinvestment due to fmancial constraints, technical shortages, and
previous sanctions. President Ahmadinejad' s own policies could also be working against him as
he has partially nationalized the industry by reducing the power of the "oil mafia," dominated by
allies of former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and replaced it with companies associated
with the Revolutionary Guard. 36 An·embargo on all oil and gas·equipment could throw the oil
and gas sector in Iran into a crisis that the Iranian government may have to address with more of
its constrained funds. Thus diverting funds from its capital-rich nuclear program.
It is true that although many cases of civil unrest have been caused by the increase in

prices, and even more with the increase in gas prices specifically, few have ever been directly
correlated with a regime change. Iran itself has had its share of civil unrest due to rising gas
prices; with the most recent in 2008, but ifthe second largest economy in the Middle East is hit
with monumental gas shortages exacerbated by inadequate internal supply caused by historical
underinvestment in refinement capability, excess demand, and the limited ability to import the
refmed commodity, Iran may be forced to rethink its allocation of funds for the development of a
militarized nuclear weapons program. Even if Iran is successful in developing a nuclear weapon,
this problem will persist, as sanctions are likely to remain. By the time Iran has developed the
capability, given that it is still possible to do so under such conditions, a feedback loop may have
been developed by its.overreliance in the oil. gas industry to fund the goverriinent and the
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shortages in the industry due to the lack of government revenues, and Iran quickly dwindles into
a failed state regardless of the newfound nuclear capacity.
In the meantime, before the full strength of the planed sanctions comes to bear on Iran,
they are making every attempt to sharply reduce its outstanding gross debt. Although financial
sanctions have made Iran suffer for its nuclear aspirations by contributing to slower rates of
capital formation and lower rates of growth due to the lack of access to international fmancial
markets/ 7 the sanctions serve as more of an annoyance to the Iranian government and more of a
restriction to the private Iranian citizen, much like the sanctions on travel. However, the
implementation ofthese sanctions was needed as Iran's outstanding debt could be reduced at a
faster rate without having done so. fu turn, the July 2012 sanctions if enacted, will have a greater
overall impact.
According to Ambassador James Dobbins, a previous high-ranking government official,
Special Advisor to the President, and current director of the RAND International Security and
Defense Policy Center, there are at least four rationales for further sanctions on Iran:

(1) Sanctions may promote positive change in the nature ofthe Iranian regime by

punishing behavior that is looked on unfavorably by the international community.

(2) Trade sanctions have deprived the Iranian military of easy access t o more
effective technologies.

(3) Even if the current Iranian leadership ignores sanctions, the ensuing

international opprobrium and economic costs serve as

an

example that may deter

other countries that are contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. If
Iran develops a nuclear bomb without paying a price in terms of sanctions and
international opprobrium, other countries would be more likely to follow the same
path, leaving the world a more dangerous place. The threat of becoming an
international pariah is one of the best reasons for pursing tougher international

sanctions -against Iran.
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(4) Sanctions provide an alternative to two even less attractive options: doing
nothing in the face of Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability or
going to war to prevent it 38
Sanctions can be useful in cooperation with diplomacy and military or threatened
military action, overt or covert, but their effects could take some time to realize. Mr.
Dobbins astutely asserts in his third rationale that it would be irresponsible for the world
community to not enact sanctions in response to an infant nuclear weapons program, and
may serve as the middleweight of options to levy against such a program. With
diplomacy being the lightweight and military action the heavyweight, economic sanctions
especially let an opponent know that more is at stake than routine diplomatic discussions,
and if the current course is stayed, war may be looming.

Influencing Iran: Military Action
In response to an overt attack on Iran's nuclear program, Iran may stall in its nuclear
pursuits and the drive for the program may lapse, although this is not the likely scenario. The
military option for the U.S. or any of its allies to conventionally attack should be the fmal option
- not just for the prohibition of a nuclear Iran, but to prohibit Iran from using that capability. If
both diplomacy and sanctions have failed and an attack from Iran is eminent, overt military
action can be justified. This is maiuly due to the possibility that a preemptive attack on Iran
would strengthen the forces opposed to the normalization of their relationship with the U.S. and
other Western states and would weaken the chances of ending the protracted conflict 39 A
preemptive conventional attack could induce a "rallying around the flag" effect, allowing the
Iranian govemmentto funnel even more funds towards the nuclear program even at the expense
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of the overall wellbeing of the general Iranian population under complete austerity measures. To
its people, the current regime and its militarized nuclear weapons program would be completely
justified if not widely embraced if a preemptive attack was carried out, and the Western hopes of
de-escalation of the situation would be out of reach.
While an overt preemptive attack should be held to the fmal contingency, covert
military options should not be constrained to such conditions and should be explored to their
fullest capability. Not only for previously stated reasons, but the fact that Iran has built its
nuclear infrastructure in relatively populated areas, the logistics of carrying out an attack while
minimizing collateral damage would be tricky.
The marriage of diplomacy, intelligence gathering, and covert action should dominate the
policy maker's plan space and with open lines of communication, should be effectively utilized
to exploit any given vulnerability deemed exploitable. To limit the need for a full-scale attack
originating from Jerusalem, the Israelis and American should coalesce in their covert efforts, and
potentially have. Examples of this are the rumors of an Israel/American team gaining the
intelligence on how to exploit a vulnerability that was detected in Iran's big city electric grids,
which are not "air-gapped" meaning that they are connected to the internet and therefore able to
be infiltrated by a Stuxnet style cyber attack.

A covert attack, which unconfirmed reports have

suggested was already carried out, was meant to sabotage the uranium enriclnnent centrifuges at
the Natanz nuclear facility in 2010. The operation was considered temporarily successful until it
was detected, but dropped the centrifuge operational capacity at Natanz over the past year by
thirty percent.

40

The debate in Israel about what an Iranian counterattack would look like has most experts
arguing that there would be either an uptick in the rocket and ballistic missile attacks on Israel's

40 "Stuxnet worm hits Iran nuclear plant staff computers" BBC. N.P. September 26, 2010. Web. April 2012.

23
homeland, an increase in terror attacks on Israeli outposts abroad, or both. Proxy forces,
Hezbollah and Hamas, would most certainly be called upon by Tehran, but the extent to which
an Iranian conventional attack would come is unclear. In fact it is unclear if there would be a
conventional response at all in the short run. However, a conventional response is not the fear.
The fear is that the response, although it may be relatively delayed, would be nuclear attack from
Iran facilitated by the invigorated enthusiasm brought forth by the preemptive attack itself.
Furthermore, the call for a preemptive attack does nothing more that temporarily delays
the Iranian nuclear program and paints the rest of the world into a comer. All the gains from
diplomacy and sanctions would be for not, and the attacking state and its allies would have to
commit to an extended number of attacks on Iranian soil to further delay the program. While it
should remain on the table as a viable option, all other options should be followed up first, as an
attack on Iran could be a monumental drain on national treasure and international lives.

Conclusion
A nuclear-armed Iran is not an unimportant problem, neither for its regional neighbors
nor the United States. It would assuredly be far better for Iran to give up the development of its
militarized nuclear program and open its borders to international inspectors, than the alternative.
However, current diplomatic efforts may fail and the imposed sanctions may not have the desired
bite that the international community is hoping for. The question then arises as to whether the
benefit of preventive war outweighs the benefit to a strategy of containment and deterrence.
Should Iran become a nuclear power, the risks may be able to be addressed with a
renewed commitment of U.S. power to the stability and security in the Middle East That renewal
could come from renegotiated treaties, military shows of force and conspicuous exercises, and
security alliances in the form of "nuclear umbrellas" that the U.S. extends to the most vulnerable
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states in the region. The odds of success to a strategy of containment and deterrence should be
carefully analyzed, and the U.S. should additionally seek the help of outside partners making this
commitment as multilateral as possible, hopefully increasing those odds. It should be clear that
the largest portion of the international community stands ready to hold Iran accountable, and that
the use of its nuclear weapons, overtly or for diplomatic gain, would put Iran in danger of
nuclear retaliation.
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The United States has successfully participated in a nuclear arms race with a vastly more
capable adversary with respect to resources than Iran, and the strategy of deterrence and
containment with the Soviet Union was ultimately a success. In fact, a policy of deterrence and
containment with Iran would be significantly less costly than the in the Cold War and the odds
would be more heavily in U.S. favor. Iran would be unable to match U.S. nuclear capability
within any reasonable timeline, and would run risk of absolute destruction without a credible
threat of the same.
Although a preventive war with Iran may be deemed a temporary success, it would most
likely come with some short-term costs and long-term devastation. A diplomatic solution is
obviously the ideal outcome, but it is uulikely that economic pressure alone will bring diplomatic
success. Offering Iran a package of incentives and disincentives if they choose not to cooperate
may at least signal their level of commitment and steadfastness to their nuclear pursuits. If lran
were to decline such an offer of incentives, their clarification purpose would assist the ultimate
diplomacy of containment and deterrence.
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The United States, its allies, and the world community as a whole must meet persistence
with persistence and fushion a combination of diplomatic measures, economic sanctions, and

41 Posen. Barry R. "A Nuclear-Armed Iran: A Difficult but Not Impossible Policy Problem." A Century Foundation
Repo rt. 2006. Web.

42 Ibid. Pg. 23
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military pressure to stymie Iran's nuclear desires. Otherwise, the policies of containment and
deterrence will have to be installed and the power profile of the world's mightiest players will
shift. Finding the right solution to the problem before it gets to that point is of dire importance, as
the risk of worldwide proliferation then becomes real and the future becomes unknowable.
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